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A B S T R A C T
Experts frequently point to carbon pricing as the most cost-eﬀective tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Empirical studies show that carbon pricing can successfully incentivise incremental emissions reductions. But
meeting temperature targets within deﬁned timelines as agreed under the Paris Agreement requires more than
incremental improvements: it requires achieving net zero emissions within a few decades. To date, there is little
evidence that carbon pricing has produced deep emission reductions, even at high prices. While much steeper
carbon prices may deliver greater abatement, political economy constraints render their feasibility doubtful. An
approach with multiple instruments, including technology mandates and targeted support for innovation, is
indispensable to avoid path dependencies and lock-in of long-lived, high-carbon assets. We argue that carbon
pricing serves several important purposes in such an instrument mix, but also that the global commitment to
deep decarbonisation requires acknowledging the vital role of instruments other than carbon pricing.
1. Introduction
Carbon pricing is recommended by experts as the most cost-eﬀective
tool for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (e.g. Stiglitz et al.,
2017, see also Mehling and Tvinnereim, 2018). This is almost certainly
true for reductions at the margin, but averting dangerous climate
change requires more than incremental abatement of emissions. Mod-
elling eﬀorts have pointed to the importance of reaching net zero
emissions as soon as possible during this century to avoid the most
dangerous eﬀects of global warming (van Vuuren et al., 2011). Parties
to the Paris Agreement have therefore committed to deep dec-
arbonisation: collectively, these countries have agreed to the objective
of keeping global warming well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels,
and of achieving net zero emissions during the second half of the cen-
tury.
Deep decarbonisation requires wholesale transformation of the
economy, and we argue that instruments geared toward cost reductions
at the margin cannot be expected to achieve such structural change on
their own. Nonetheless, carbon pricing is currently being advanced in
multiple venues as the single most important policy instrument to ad-
dress climate change, dominating political debates and beneﬁtting from
substantial public resources for stakeholder outreach, public diplomacy
and capacity building. A recent article, for instance, argues that “among
all instruments carbon pricing deserves the most serious attention from
researchers, politicians, and citizens” (Baranzini et al., 2017). Our
concern is that such an exclusive focus on carbon pricing could hold
back the study and deployment of other necessary mitigation policies,
and may ironically contribute to stranded assets and higher costs to
both emitters and society at large.
In this Policy Perspective, we start by reviewing the empirical track
record of how carbon pricing has contributed to reduce emissions
(Section 2). We then point out its limitations, notably incurred by the
geophysical limits of the atmosphere combined with political economy
constraints on price levels and coverage (Section 3). Based on these
observations, we argue that carbon pricing has shown potential to halt
the increase in emissions (inﬂow), but that we cannot rely on it to
stabilize absolute concentration levels (stock). We go on to discuss
policy interactions, including what can go wrong when carbon prices
are implemented sub-optimally (Section 4). Finally, we conclude on the
proper place of carbon pricing in a wider global warming mitigation
portfolio, arguing that prices work best on existing capital stock while
technology mandates and innovation policies should dominate the ﬁeld
of new investment.
2. Incremental mitigation: a positive track record
As a concept, carbon pricing can have diﬀerent meanings: it can
denote a climate change mitigation tool, an input in energy-economy-
climate models, and a theoretical construct to represent the social cost
of global warming. Here, we focus on the ﬁrst dimension, its role as an
instrument of climate policy, which has been deﬁned by the World
Bank as “initiatives that put an explicit price on greenhouse gas
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emissions, i.e., a price expressed as a value per ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent (tCO2e)” (World Bank, 2017a, p. 20). In practical terms, an
explicit price on greenhouse gas emissions can be implemented by a
ﬁxed payment obligation in the form of a carbon tax, charge, or levy, or
alternatively through a limit on aggregate emissions where a market for
tradable emission permits – often referred to as a cap-and-trade system
– reveals the price.
Economic theory commonly casts climate change as one or several
market failures that each need to be addressed using a dedicated policy
instrument (Goulder and Parry, 2008). One such market failure – the
unpriced externality of climate damages – can be addressed with the
introduction of the foregoing carbon pricing policies.
Evidence from existing carbon taxes, for instance, conﬁrms their
ability to lower emissions relative to a business-as-usual scenario.
Sterner (2007) has noted that global emissions from transport would
have been much higher if Europe and Japan had not had high fuel tax
levels, which are functionally similar to a carbon tax. Bruvoll and
Larsen (2004) argue that the relatively high Norwegian carbon tax
implemented in 1991 contributed to reducing emissions per unit of GDP
over the period 1990–1999. Andersson (2017) analyses the case of the
Swedish carbon tax, also implemented in 1991, comparing actual
transport sector emissions to business-as-usual emissions. The coun-
terfactual emission trajectory derives from a “synthetic Sweden” based
on data from OECD countries that did not introduce signiﬁcant carbon
taxes. These modelling exercises suggest that emissions are 11% lower
in an average year due to the combination of a carbon tax and a value
added tax on transport fuel, compared to the counterfactual. Andersson
argues that the persistence and credibility of carbon taxes inﬂuences
vehicle purchase decisions, thus producing a greater long-term eﬀect on
emissions than oil price ﬂuctuations. Lin and Li (2011) ﬁnd some
emission reductions from carbon taxes in ﬁve North European coun-
tries, but note that exemptions reduce the eﬀectiveness of these taxes.
Computable general equilibrium modelling and econometric diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence studies of the carbon tax introduced in British Columbia in
2008 suggest that it resulted in a 5–15% decline in fossil fuel use by
2012 (Murray and Rivers, 2015).
Likewise, carbon pricing through cap-and-trade systems has proven
to be eﬀective in mitigating emissions (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2017).
Mandated emission trajectories result in absolute emission reductions
over time. Under the European Union emissions trading system (EU
ETS), a cap-and-trade system that has been in place since 2005 and
currently covers 31 countries, available evidence suggests that emis-
sions across all regulated sectors declined by around 3% during the ﬁrst
ﬁve years of operation, relative to estimated business-as-usual emis-
sions (Martin et al., 2016: 143). A cap-and-trade system for the elec-
tricity sector introduced by a group of states in the U.S. Northeast and
Mid-Atlantic in 2009, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),
has also contributed to emissions abatement, although a majority of
emission reductions stem from investments in energy eﬃciency and
renewable energy ﬁnanced through auctioning revenue (Hibbard et al.,
2018). Overall, emission reductions under cap-and-trade systems have
tended to occur at lower prices than initially expected, demonstrating
the potential cost-eﬀectiveness of pricing mechanisms (Tvinnereim,
2014).
3. Deep decarbonisation: a mixed track record
3.1. Relative, absolute and deep emission reductions
Based on the empirical works reviewed so far, carbon prices have
clearly demonstrated a potential to reduce emissions relative to busi-
ness-as-usual trajectories. At the same time, several studies acknowl-
edge that total emissions under carbon taxes have grown, not declined,
in the relevant countries and sectors over the studied periods. Cap-and-
trade systems have seen absolute emission reductions, but changes have
been marginal rather than deep.
The Swedish example, which has already been mentioned, is useful.
Sweden has one of the highest carbon prices in the world – arguably the
highest – at US$140 per tonne of CO2 (World Bank, 2017b). This makes
it an important case study for carbon pricing: if anything, the Swedish
experience should underscore the mitigation potential of a price on
carbon. And yet, emissions in covered sectors have only decreased in-
crementally and not consistent with a deep decarbonisation pathway.
Speciﬁcally, Sweden's road transportation emissions declined only four
percent from 1990 – the year before the carbon tax was introduced – to
2015, see Fig. 1.
But how high is the Swedish carbon price compared to the projected
abatement cost of averting serious climate change, as indicated by cli-
mate models? In its latest assessment report, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) presented an overview of idealised
energy-economy-climate models consistent with the strictest con-
centration target of 430–480 ppm CO2e by 2100 (IPCC, 2014:
Fig. 6.21(a), p. 450). Among the 34 scenarios presented, the lower-
quartile carbon price was US$37 and the upper-quartile price US$67
per tonne of CO2 in 2020. The corresponding range for 2050 was US
$127-US$305 per tonne. These prices are based on marginal abatement
costs under given emission trajectories, and are thus not directly com-
parable with actual carbon taxes; the scenarios also typically do not
assume early mitigation from transportation (IPCC, 2014, p. 480).
Nevertheless, a carbon pricing policy at or exceeding the projected
abatement cost should spur suﬃcient mitigation to remain on a re-
duction pathway broadly consistent with the foregoing climate target.
As this comparison illustrates, carbon prices within modelled, high-
ambition mitigation cost ranges already exist, but their abatement ef-
fect in the real world may diverge from the abatement levels projected
by modelling eﬀorts.
3.2. Geophysical limits
As seen above, carbon prices can spur incremental emission re-
ductions or cause emissions to decline relative to counterfactual levels.
So far, however, the empirical track record does not document deep
emission reductions resulting from carbon pricing on its own.
Why does this matter? Incremental abatement or emission reduc-
tions relative to a counterfactual baseline are a good start, but are not
good enough when the goal is to eliminate virtually all emissions in the
short to medium term. Deep decarbonisation within a rigid timeline is
an urgent imperative, according to the literature on “carbon budgets”,
which posits that humanity only has a ﬁnite amount of greenhouse
gases left to emit in order to achieve the 2 °C target (Meinshausen et al.,
2009). Because of the long-lived nature of greenhouse gases in the at-
mosphere, stabilisation of their concentrations in the atmosphere (the
Fig. 1. Swedish emissions, UNFCCC category 1.A.3.b Road Transportation,
1990–2015.
Source: UNFCCC.
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stock) requires net emissions (inﬂow minus outﬂow) to decline to zero.
Thus, unlike earlier problems such as acid rain, the challenge is not
simply to reduce annual emissions below certain dangerous thresholds,
but rather to decarbonise the economy and eventually phase out all
emissions. To achieve the temperature goals set out in the Paris
Agreement, therefore, climate policy cannot limit itself to reducing
emissions incrementally; emissions have to cease entirely. That, in turn,
requires a systemic transformation of the economy rather than gradual
optimisation of emitting technologies. Policies inﬂuencing abatement
decisions at the margin may altogether prove unsuited to the scale of
climate change risks, risks that are “far outside the familiar policy
questions and standard, largely marginal, techniques commonly used”
(Stern, 2014: 398).
3.3. Political economy constraints
Given the geophysical limits on acceptable emissions (essentially
zero), why not introduce carbon prices at levels that are high enough to
meet this long-term, zero target? After all, most carbon taxes and
emission allowance prices around the world are lower than the stipu-
lated mitigation costs summarised by the IPCC (2014) and the stipu-
lated social cost of carbon used by the OECD (2016) and several na-
tional governments (see e.g. for the United States: Nordhaus, 2017).
While the net zero emissions target called for by climate science
might potentially be met by means of radically higher carbon prices,
there are reasons to be cautious about excessive reliance on such a
strategy. First, as shown above, there is no empirical precedent for deep
emission reductions spurred by carbon pricing, even where prices are
high, as in the example of Sweden. Second, experience has shown that
carbon pricing faces considerable political economy constraints
(Jenkins and Karplus, 2016). Typically, carbon prices make the cost of
compliance visible and impose this cost disproportionately on a limited
group of articulate and politically inﬂuential emitters, while spreading
out the beneﬁt – the incremental mitigation of climate change – among
many diﬀuse and poorly organised constituents. This makes carbon
pricing a textbook example of a policy susceptible to regulatory capture
and the general failure of collective action in the common interest
(Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971).
Research has therefore suggested that instruments other than
carbon pricing are better able to build coalitions of support (Meckling
et al., 2015), and opinion surveys have conﬁrmed that they are also
more popular with the public (Krosnick and MacInnis, 2013). Due to
such increased support, these policies achieve greater policy durability
and can ultimately even expand the political space for higher carbon
prices (Wagner et al., 2015). Ultimately, this argues the case for a se-
quential approach, in which carbon pricing does not play a pioneering
role, but rather follows as a complementary policy (Pahle et al., 2017).
4. From marginal reductions to deep decarbonisation
We have so far discussed the empirical record of carbon pricing as a
global warming mitigation tool and discussed the limitations imposed
on its performance in the real world by geophysics and political
economy. This article does not argue against using carbon pricing as a
mitigation instrument, but rather to caution against placing too much
faith in a theoretically compelling policy instrument. In this section, we
discuss shortfalls of carbon pricing when price levels are set too low, or
when pricing operates in isolation from other necessary policy instru-
ments such as support for innovation. We also highlight solutions
identiﬁed in the literature and in practice.
4.1. Carbon lock-in
Carbon prices have to date not been suﬃcient to avoid investment
in long-lived, emitting capital stock. To return to the Swedish transport
example above, emissions from vehicle use are only one dimension of
the decarbonisation challenge. Another is investment in carbon-emit-
ting assets such as cars, and the path dependencies that follow. New
gasoline and diesel vehicle registrations in Sweden have grown in re-
cent years (Traﬁkanalys, 2017), showing that even a carbon price well
above the range suggested by experts for the year 2030 (Stiglitz et al.,
2017) has been insuﬃcient to meaningfully curb new investment in a
carbon-emitting technology. That, in turn, incurs carbon lock-in
throughout the normal economic life of the technology (Seto et al.,
2016), which, in the case of road vehicles, can be a decade or more.
This experience suggests that, in the absence of additional policy levers,
carbon pricing may not only fail to deliver deep emission reductions in
the short term, but it may also fail to set in motion the necessary steps
to achieve decarbonisation in the medium and long term. There is little
evidence, for instance, that carbon pricing has been able to spur in-
vestment in the innovation ecosystems and new infrastructures, such as
charging stations, that would be needed for a transition to electric ve-
hicles.
For stationary assets in the energy sector, turnover rates are even
longer, exacerbating the challenge of carbon lock-in. Experience with
the EU ETS bears this out. The price signal generated by the EU ETS has
been insuﬃcient to stimulate a lasting switch from high- to low-carbon
fuels for electricity generation (European Commission, 2015). Fur-
thermore, the failure of emissions trading on its own to spur meaningful
innovation has been documented in the cases of both the EU ETS (Calel
and Dechezleprêtre, 2016) and US SO2 and NOx markets (Taylor, 2012).
Price volatility, coupled with uncertainty about the future evolution
and ambition of the carbon market, have contributed to investment
decisions that are incompatible with a deep decarbonisation pathway
(Acworth et al., 2017).
Some of these eﬀects can be addressed through improved policy
design, such as price management features. But as the tedious nego-
tiations on EU ETS reform have shown, attempts to strengthen carbon
pricing policies are politically diﬃcult and take time – time which we
may lack: Pfeiﬀer et al. (2016) have suggested that no net emitting
electricity infrastructure can be added after 2017 if the 2 °C threshold is
to be met. So far, however, the EU ETS has been unable to prevent
continued investment in thermal generation assets across Europe
(ENTSOE, 2017), where several new coal-ﬁred power plants are cur-
rently in various planning, permitting and construction stages (Shearer
et al., 2017).
4.2. Phasing in innovation, phasing out obsolete technologies
Notwithstanding their known shortcomings from a static cost-ef-
fectiveness perspective (Fischer and Newell, 2008), policies other than
carbon pricing have recently garnered renewed attention in the litera-
ture. Acemoglu et al. (2012), for instance, recommend a balance be-
tween moderate carbon taxes and innovation subsidies. In recent
modelling work, the view is strengthening that a uniform and suﬃ-
ciently high carbon price is out of reach, and that additional, “second-
best” instruments are needed (Labandeira and Linares, 2011). Bertram
et al. (2015) argue that such policy portfolios can have fewer dis-
tributional eﬀects and smaller eﬃciency losses relative to the “optimal”
universal carbon price. Similarly, Jenkins (2014) favours a multi-in-
strument approach including incentives for technological development,
notably through creative use of carbon pricing revenues. The sub-
stantial eﬀects of strategic revenue recycling relative to the behavioural
eﬀect of the carbon price itself have been borne out in practice with the
U.S. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Hibbard et al., 2018), and are
also key to fostering enduring public support (Amdur et al., 2014;
Kotchen et al., 2017).
In practice, policymakers are already drawing on a rich portfolio of
instruments to address climate change. Performance and technology
standards are widely used for buildings, vehicles and electric appli-
ances; support measures for research, development and deployment of
renewable energy are in place in a majority of jurisdictions. Although
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some of these instruments have rightly invited criticism for their eco-
nomic cost, their environmental eﬀectiveness has been widely docu-
mented. For example, where carbon pricing has operated alongside
direct regulation, empirical studies have generally ascribed a greater
abatement eﬀect to the latter (Gloaguen and Alberola, 2013; Rhodes
and Jaccard, 2013).
More study is therefore needed into the performance of these in-
struments relative to carbon pricing as policy tools for deep dec-
arbonisation, and into policy designs that can address known economic
ineﬃciencies. Empirical insights from actual operation, rather than
theoretical assumptions, should inform such research and improve our
understanding of alternative pathways to a zero-carbon economy.
The recent surge in technology phase-out mandates may, in part, be
a reaction to the inability of carbon pricing to prevent new investment
in emitting technologies. Despite eﬀective carbon rates on transport
fuels that are often in excess of $100/tonne CO2 equivalent (OECD,
2016), several countries, including China, India, France, the United
Kingdom, and Norway, have recently proposed future bans on new
vehicle sales for cars with internal combustion engines. In doing so,
these countries ensure that all new capital stock in the transport sector
will have zero direct emissions within a given time. Likewise, a number
of countries are introducing policies to limit or phase out coal use in
electricity generation (Powering Past Coal Alliance, 2017), including
the United Kingdom, which already has one of the highest carbon prices
for electricity generators due to its domestic carbon ﬂoor price. But as
that example also shows, hasty or uncoordinated action can result in
undesirable spillover eﬀects and higher cost, in this case when a uni-
lateral phase-out displaces emission allowances that become available
for continued emissions in other parts of Europe.
By acknowledging the role of these complementary instruments, we
are not arguing against carbon prices as such. Nor do we contend that
carbon price signals have failed to inﬂuence current emission levels.
What we are suggesting, instead, is that the empirical record casts
doubt on the ability of even very high carbon prices to achieve dec-
arbonisation anywhere near the levels required under politically agreed
targets.
5. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing considerations, we may need to altogether
rethink the appropriate role of carbon pricing in a dynamic process of
decarbonisation: instead of spearheading innovation and systemic
transformation, it may be most useful where it can incentivise marginal
optimisation in speciﬁc contexts, such as fuel switching in the elec-
tricity sector (Grubb, 2014). It can provide revenue for other measures
and serve as a backstop policy to incentivise abatement in areas that
more targeted instruments are unable to reach, a role it has been, for
instance, expressly assigned in California (Legislative Analyst's Oﬃce,
2017). Over time, as targeted policies increase tolerance and support
for higher carbon prices, it may eventually unleash more of its potential
as a cost-eﬀective tool of climate mitigation. Finally, the presence of a
price on carbon emissions can send an omnibus signal that policy ma-
kers are serious about tackling global warming, and that long-term
investments need to be made with expectations of future carbon con-
straints in mind.
Our call for re-assessing the primacy of carbon pricing has im-
plications for future research, research communication, and policy.
First, researchers should exert caution when stating that carbon taxes
are the “optimal” or “ideal” climate change mitigation policy while
referring to other instruments as “second-best” or “auxiliary.” Instead,
greater acknowledgment is owed to the evidence that deep dec-
arbonisation may not be attained through carbon pricing alone, and
that regulations, ﬁnancial incentives, and public and private investment
therefore play important roles on the path towards the global 1.5 °C and
2 °C targets. Policies to improve access to capital for low-carbon in-
vestment are of particular relevance, not least because a high cost of
capital can signiﬁcantly undermine the eﬀectiveness of carbon pricing
(Hirth and Steckel, 2016). Preventing carbon lock-in through long-lived
capital assets may necessitate additional interventions, such as tech-
nology phase-outs (Geels et al., 2017), yet research into the design,
eﬀects and interactions of such policies has lagged far behind the study
of carbon pricing itself. As a result, policymakers may lack the in-
formation needed to apply these instruments in a way that avoids un-
necessary cost and other detrimental eﬀects.
Similar changes are needed in the communication of research. For
instance, while the integrated assessment models (IAMs) widely used to
guide policy decisions do in fact distinguish between explicit carbon
prices (paid to the government in the form of carbon taxes, or revealed
in markets for emission allowances) and implicit carbon prices
(abatement costs per ton), this distinction needs to be communicated
more eﬀectively. Likewise, the use of a (theoretical) global carbon price
in models needs to be discussed in strict separation from the policy
option of introducing a global, uniform carbon tax or emissions trading
system.
Finally, policymakers need to be made aware of the limits to carbon
pricing. For all its potentially beneﬁcial eﬀects, a price on carbon does
not guarantee that emitting activities will cease within committed
timelines of deep decarbonisation. Most importantly, where pricing
cannot ensure prevention of sunk costs in carbon-intensive capital
stock, policymakers should not ignore the potential need for additional
measures just because these may undermine their carbon pricing sys-
tems. The aggregate losses from stranded assets will probably be a more
serious economic problem in the future than the potential ineﬃciencies
arising from complementary policies. All this suggests that a price on
carbon is useful, but far from suﬃcient to achieve deep decarbonisa-
tion.
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